We consider school choice problems where one has to match students to schools (our results are not confined to this class of models; they can be applied to any many-to-one matching model with responsive preferences). The environments we consider, that we call pre-matching problems, are made of schools' priority lists over students and, for each student, the list of acceptable schools. Students' preferences over their acceptable schools, however, are left unspecified.
We consider school choice problems where one has to match students to schools (our results are not confined to this class of models; they can be applied to any many-to-one matching model with responsive preferences). The environments we consider, that we call pre-matching problems, are made of schools' priority lists over students and, for each student, the list of acceptable schools. Students' preferences over their acceptable schools, however, are left unspecified.
The question we address is the following. Given a pair student-school, is there a realization of students' preferences such that they can be matched at a stable matching (for those preferences)? If the answer is negative then the pair is called an impossible match. Our main contribution consists of characterizing impossible matches in prematching problems.
We show that a student i is an impossible match for a school s if, and only if, there exists a set J i of students, called block, such that the pre-matching restricted to students in the block satisfies:
(a) For some subset of students J ⊆ J there is a perfect match between J and the schools acceptable for the students in J; (b) For every J ⊂ J\J i,s there is no perfect match between the students and their schools in the pre-matching problem truncated at J if one seat of s is removed, where J i,s is the set of students in J that have higher priority than i at s.
Our results establishes then a link between Hall's marriage theorem and Gale and Shapley's stability concept, and offer a new methodology to assess to what extent the preferences on one side of a matching market can preset the stable matchings that can emerge. We use this technique to discuss the impact of priority zoning in school choice problems.
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